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The common perception appears to be that vertical integration of advertising services is more the 
exception than the rule in the U.S. advertising industry. This study investigates the extent of such 
outsourcing and examines inter-industry variation in the use of in-house rather than independent 
advertising agencies by U.S. advertisers. While the vast majority of large advertisers employ outside 
agencies, it comes as a surprise to find that when advertisers of all sizes are considered, about half 
operate some form of in-house agency. Internalization of advertising services is much more 
widespread than has hitherto been appreciated and varies widely across industries. To explain this 
variation, we draw on concepts from research on scale economies and transaction costs to develop a 
set of hypotheses which we test in cross sectional analyses of data covering 69 two digit SIC 
industries at two points in time, 1991 and 1999. Across industries, we find that the likelihood of 
internalization of advertising services decreases as the size of advertising outlays increase but 
increases as advertising intensity and technological intensity increase and is greater for “creative” 
industries.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“The man who acts as his own advertising agent sometimes has a fool for a client.” 
Nathaniel C. Fowler, (Fowler’s Publicity, 1904, p.192). 
 
How widespread is the vertical integration of advertising services? And how can variation in the 
internalization of advertising services be explained? Most large U.S. advertisers rely on independent 
agencies for advertising services but many other advertisers operate in-house advertising agencies. 
While no extended time series relating to the use of in-house agencies are available, historical 
evidence suggests that reliance by major national advertisers on external rather than internal agencies 
emerged as the dominant industry policy early in the evolution of modern advertising (Pope 1983). 
Over the years, advertisers’ interest in establishing in-house agencies has waxed and waned (Loomis 
1972). Despite occasional indications to the contrary, “self-sufficiency” has long been treated as more 
the exception rather than the rule in the U.S. advertising business (e.g., Gardner 1976, 1988). But 
industry observers have often noted that utilization of in-house agencies is more prevalent in certain 
sectors or industries than others (Anderson and Weitz 1986; Clark 2003) and scattered evidence 
corroborates this view (e.g., Ripley 1991). Whereas inter-industry differences with respect to the 
purposes and intensity of advertising have been extensively investigated (e.g., Comanor and Wilson 
1974; Nelson 1974), inter-industry variation in the integration of advertising services has been 
neglected. We address this void by investigating the pattern and persistence of industry differences 
in the integration of advertising services in the U.S.     
Research on the economics of the supply of advertising services is scarce (Bagwell 2007). The only 
study that has addressed governance issues theoretically and empirically is Horsky (2006). Her focus 
was on the decisions made by large advertisers with respect to the choice between bundled or 
unbundled advertisers’ services (whether purchased externally or organized internally), as observed 
at the firm level and a single point in time. The present study takes a different approach: (1) we The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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analyze the effects of industry-specific sources of both production and transaction costs on inter-
industry differences in the internalization  of advertising services; and (2) we consider vertical 
integration by advertisers of all sizes at two points in time that bracket a major business cycle in the 
U.S. economy. This design enables us to develop a comprehensive picture of the extent of vertical 
integration across the economy during the decade of the 1990’s.   
 We account for inter-industry variation in the relative incidence of advertisers’ use of in-house 
rather than independent advertising agencies by drawing on theories of vertical integration that 
suggest the scope of a firm is determined by both production and transaction costs. With respect to 
production costs, advertisers confront a critical tradeoff.  If a firm “buys,” the compensation paid to 
the outside agency includes markups on its creative, production, and media costs. The costs the 
outside agency incurs when purchasing media time and space includes the media suppliers’ markup, 
resulting in inefficiency associated with double marginalization (Spengler 1950). If a firm “makes,” it 
avoids payment of the agency’s markups (Bursk and Sethi 1976). But the internalized unit may fail to 
achieve minimum efficient scale, thereby suffering a cost penalty. That is, an in-house agency, 
operating on a smaller scale, may sacrifice size-related economies realized by an independent agency 
serving numerous clients (Silk and Berndt 1993).  
The focus on margins, double marginalization, and scale economies is incomplete; transaction 
costs must also be considered (Lafontaine and Slade 2007). Vertical integration of advertising services 
may entail investments in transaction-specific assets (Williamson 1975, 1985) such that the cost of 
organizing them internally is less than that associated with employing an outside agency, as has been 
suggested by several authors (Anderson and Weitz 1986; Ruekert, Walker, and Roering 1985; Taplin 
1963).  The leading historian of advertising considers but rejects transaction cost analysis as a possible 
explanation for the governance structure that developed in the agency business and suggests that 
advertising services may be an industry where Williamson’s (1975) theory “may not hold” (Pope The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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1983, p. 152), thus lending both institutional and theoretical interest to our research question. 
This study advances understanding of vertical integration of advertising services at two levels. 
First, we find it to be much more widespread than has hitherto been appreciated. Almost half of all 
U.S. advertisers (large and small) operated some form of in-house advertising unit in the decade of 
the 1990’s.1 The share of all advertisers with in-house advertising services was 43% in 1991 and 
increased to 53% in 1999, where the two points in time mark a full business cycle.  
Second, we show that across industries, the incidence of such vertical integration varies widely, 
with the fraction of advertisers within different industries having in-house advertising services 
varying from one-sixth to three-quarters. Our analysis indicates that this internalization varies 
systematically across industries in ways consistent with theories of vertical integration. Unlike much 
“make or buy” research in marketing and elsewhere, we explicitly consider both production and 
transaction costs in our theoretical and empirical analysis. Industry differences with respect to both 
production and transaction costs play significant roles in explaining this cross industry variation in 
vertical integration. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and reviews pertinent 
theory and research. Section 3 describes two cross-sectional databases and sets forth the econometric 
model and method used to test the hypotheses. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 discusses our 
findings, limitations of the study, and directions for further research. Section 6 considers the 
managerial implications of our findings, relating them to current issues and developments 
surrounding the organization of marketing services. Section 7 summarizes our results and 
conclusions. 
                                                            
1 To the best of our knowledge, the only comparable estimates available in the literature are those due to Hasse, Lockely, and 
Digges (1934) who found that share of advertisers who placed advertising directly with media rather than through agencies 
was stable at around 24.percent from 1924-27; it then dropped to 19 percent in 1928 just prior to the onslaught of the 
depression. However, that share rebounded in 1929 to 20 percent and continued   rising, reaching approximately 28 percent in 




2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The institutional structure that emerged in the U.S. advertising industry’s formative years has 
had a lasting effect on the industry’s organization and practices (Pope 1983). Taking account of those 
institutional arrangements along with contemporary developments pertaining to advertising agency 
economics and client relations, we develop five hypotheses about inter-industry variation in the 
internalization of advertising services.  
2.1 Scale-Related Economies and Double Marginalization 
Costs figure prominently in discussions of the “make or buy” decision found in the trade 
literature on advertising services (Britt, Donahue, and Foley 1975; Holtze 1981; Newton 1965; Pulver 
1979). Can advertisers operate an in-house agency at a lower cost than the compensation required to 
retain an outside agency? Horsky (2006) has recently noted that this issue may be approached from 
the viewpoint of the effects of double marginalization (Lafontaine and Slade 2007) and scale 
economies on the choice between vertical separation and integration. 
First, consider the total cost of an advertising campaign for an advertiser who employs a full-
service advertising agency. 
Ca = Ka + ΔKa + Pa + ΔPa + Ba + ΔBa + Ms + ΔMs, (1) 
where: 
Ca   = Total cost of a campaign for an advertiser employing an outside advertising agency; 
Ka    = Cost to agency of creative services;  
ΔKa= Margin agency charges advertiser for creative services;  
Pa   = Cost to agency of production services; 
ΔPa = Margin agency charges for production services; 
Ba    = Agency’s cost of media planning and buying services supplied for advertiser’s The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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campaign; 
ΔBa  = Margin agency charges for media planning and buying services; 
Ms   = Cost to media supplier of time and space for advertiser’s campaign;  
ΔMs = Margin media supplier charges on media purchased by agency for advertiser’s 
campaign. 
Thus an advertiser employing an independent agency encounters four margins: ΔKa, ΔPa, ΔBa, 
and ΔMs. The first three margins relate to the set of services provided by the agency while the fourth 
margin is that of the media supplier and included in the price of time and space purchased by the 
agency on behalf of the advertiser. 
Next, consider the total cost of a campaign for an advertiser that vertically integrates the services needed to plan, 
produce, and implement an advertising campaign. 
Cv = Kv + Pv + Bv + Mv + ΔMv   (2) 
where Cv is the total cost of the campaign to the advertiser with vertically integrated services and 
is equal to the sum of the costs of operating internal creative (Kv), production (Pv) and media (Bv) 
services plus the cost of the media time and space (Mv + ΔMv) purchased directly from media 
suppliers. An advertiser has an incentive to internalize advertising services when there is a cost 
advantage to doing so, i.e. 
Cv < Ca,    (3) 
or when:             
(Kv + Pv + Bv + Mv + ΔMv) < (Ka + ΔKa + Pa + ΔPa + Ba + ΔBa + Ms + ΔMs)   (4) 
One argument often made in favor of establishing an in-house agency stresses the potential cost 
savings realized by avoiding the margins an agency charges over and above the costs incurred in 
supplying the services (i.e., the terms ΔKa, ΔPa, and ΔBa on the right-hand side of (4)).  
Integration further eliminates the informational equivalent of “double marginalization” which 
involves the three agency margins referred to above plus the margin demanded by the media The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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supplier (ΔMs). In the vertical relationship where an advertiser employs an agency and the agency 
buys time and space from a media supplier, both the agency and the media supplier demand margins 
over and above their costs. In setting their margins, both the agency and media supplier ignore the 
negative consequences of their actions on the other’s profits in that an increase in either margin 
reduces the overall demand for advertising services. Thus, each “inflates” their respective margin. 
Hence, the advertiser has an incentive to promote efficiency by internalizing the agency’s functions 
and thereby avoid paying the agency’s margins.2 
But this line of argument which concentrates on the margins (and the fact that they are smaller on 
the left hand side than on the right hand side of inequality (4)) ignores the magnitude of the cost 
terms in inequality (4); that is: (Kv + Pv + Bv + Mv) ≤ (Ka + Pa + Ba + Ms). It tends to underestimate the 
scale-related economies available to an external agency through pooling the demands from many 
different clients. Prior research has shown that advertising agency operations are indeed subject to 
significant scale and scope economies. Silk and Berndt (1993) estimate that the minimum efficient size 
of a full-service agency required a gross income of $3-4 million in 1987 dollars or equivalently, 
expenditures in the range of $25-33 million; assuming agency gross income represented 12% of client 
billings. Clearly, an expenditure of that magnitude exceeds the advertising budgets of numerous 
firms. Since an in-house agency usually serves a single client (Pulver 1979), it may sacrifice scale-
related economies. Then, the reverse of (3) and (4) holds, such that Cv > Ca, and use of an outside 
agency is less costly than operating an in-house agency. 
Silk and Berndt (1993) observed that in 1987, each of the 100 largest national advertisers had 
expenditures that exceeded the estimated minimum efficient agency size but less than 5% of them 
operated an in-house agency. Moreover, Schmalensee, Silk, and Bojanek (1983) had earlier shown that 
                                                            
2   Spengler (1950) has shown that for a vertical market structure with successive stages of monopoly, the integrated industry 
realizes more profits than the nonintegrated industry and the final price is lower under integration.  The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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larger agencies tended to have not only more accounts, but also larger accounts, than smaller 
agencies. When negotiating compensation agreements, large advertisers are in a stronger bargaining 
position than smaller advertisers to capture size-related economies available to agencies. Pursuit of 
this advantage has been facilitated by the changes in compensation methods wherein billings-based 
commissions have been replaced by labor fee-based arrangements. As part of this shift in 
compensation practices, it has become commonplace for clients to review their accounts’ profitability 
and to audit agency costs (Beals 2007). 
Furt h erm o re ,  agen c ie s w it h  la rger  acco un t s a re in  a  st ro n ger b ar gain in g  p o sit io n  w it h  m e dia  
suppliers enabling them to capture size-related economies associated with larger purchases of media 
space and time. This effect could lead to (Ms + ΔMs) < (Mv + ΔMv). In addition, agencies having more 
accounts realize size-related economies with respect to other services that may result in (Ka+ Pa + Ba) 
< (Kv + Pv + Bv). 
Overall, vertical integration is expected to be more likely among small advertisers seeking to 
avoid double-marginalization than among large advertisers seeking to take advantage of size-related 
economies available to independent agencies. Thus, we hypothesize:    
H1:   The greater the volume of advertising services demanded by a client, the greater the scale-
related cost advantage of an external advertising agency serving multiple clients, and the 
less the likelihood of vertical integration. 
2.2 Transaction Cost Analysis 
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework. Following Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), Williamson’s (1975, 1985) 
framework may be summarized as consisting of two basic assumptions about human behavior 
(bounded rationality and opportunism) and two fundamental dimensions of transactions (asset 
specificity and uncertainty). The interaction of these behavioral and transaction factors gives rise to a 
set of governance problems: (a) safeguarding specific assets in the face of opportunism; (b) adapting 
contractual arrangements under conditions of bounded rationality and uncertainty; and (c) The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
 
10 
evaluating contractual performance given asset specificity and opportunism. The presence (or 
absence) of these governance problems affects the magnitude of transactions costs a firm will face 
w h e n  i t  c h o o s e s  t o  r e l y  o n  m a r k e t  e x c h a n g e .  When the costs of addressing these governance 
problems are sufficiently high to offset any advantage with respect to production costs available to an 
external supplier, a firm will opt for vertical integration.3 We now apply these concepts to advertising 
services. 
2.2.2 Transaction Costs and Agency-Client Relations. Williamson (1985) maintains “the most critical 
dimension for describing transactions is asset specificity” (p. 30) which he defines as “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which 
investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated” (p. 55). Of the various types of asset specificity recognized in 
transaction cost analysis, human asset specificity is the most relevant here inasmuch as two-thirds to 
three-quarters of an advertising agency’s total costs are for labor-related expenses (Comanor, Kover, 
and Smiley 1981; Silk and Berndt 1993.)   
A specific human asset exists in the account team formed within an agency to serve a client. Such 
teams consist of personnel from various areas of expertise (e.g., planners, creative, media, and 
research) who frequently interact with client representatives in planning, developing, and producing 
campaigns. Thus, an advertising campaign is the outcome of the coordinated efforts of the client and 
agency and may be described as co-produced (Broschak 2004). In carrying out their tasks, agency 
personnel acquire specialized knowledge about the client’s products, markets, strategy and 
organization. As Anderson and Weitz (1986) point out: “Such knowledge is a valuable company-
                                                            
3  See David and Han (2004) and Macher and Richman (2008) for reviews of empirical research of transaction cost economics.  
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specific capability” (p. 16). Part of the specialized knowledge acquired by agency personnel in the 
course of working with a particular client relates to conditions that prevail in the particular industry 
where the client operates. Hence, the value of the specialized human assets that resides with an 
account team consists of both client-specific and industry-specific components.4  The magnitude of 
the industry-specific component affects the value of account personnel if they are redeployed to 
another client in the same industry and that value is likely to vary across industries, given industry 
differences in the nature and use of advertising (Comanor and Wilson 1974). 
That the value of specialized human capital contains industry-specific as well as client-specific 
elements is suggested by several agency practices. Agency personnel typically serve on the accounts 
of more than one client (American Association of Advertising Agencies 1987) and are highly mobile 
over the course of their careers, moving not only between agencies but also from agency to client 
organizations (Broschak 2004). Recognition that human assets have a high value when redeployed to 
another account in the same industry is reflected in the longstanding norm that prohibits an agency 
from serving the account of a competitor of a current client (American Association of Advertising 
Agencies 1979; Stone 1989). The exclusivity agencies grant clients is customarily limited to a single 
product category or industry and agency-client contracts generally include a clause that defines 
conflict explicitly by delineating the bounds of competition (Stone 1989). 
 Long-term agency-client contracts are rare (Comanor, Kover, and Smiley 1981; Stone 1989) and 
the duration of agency-client relationships is highly variable, from months to decades (Broschak 
2004). In the absence of long-term contractual safeguards or the freedom to employ industry or 
product-specific knowledge concurrently on accounts of competing clients, agencies may under-
invest in specialized knowledge. By providing relatively greater security of employment, integration 
can induce higher investments in specialized knowledge by agency personnel. It also bears noting 
                                                            
4  The multidimensionality of asset specificity has been recognized in other TCE research. For example, Anderson (1988, pp. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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that agency-client contracts specify that the property rights to the content of the advertising messages 
created by an agency (such as slogans and symbols) are vested in the client (Stone 1989). Hence, a 
client has no incentive to integrate in order to acquire property rights to advertising content. 
2.2.3 Advertising Intensity and Human Asset Specificity. It has long been observed that differentiated 
products tend to be more heavily advertised than relatively undifferentiated ones and thus 
advertising intensity (ratio of advertising expenditures to sales revenue) is often used as a proxy for 
the importance of product differentiation in industry competition (Comanor and Wilson 1974). As 
discussed above, the development and production of advertising campaigns involves outlays for 
nonstandard, campaign-specific inputs generated by account teams. Campaign costs are sunk in the 
sense of being irrecoverable and last period’s campaign affects this period’s environment (Sutton 
1991). More differentiation is likely to require more transaction specific investment (Dyer 1996; Lajili, 
Madunic, and Mahoney 2007). Thus, following Levy (1985) and Gatignon and Anderson (1988), 
advertising intensity can be taken as a proxy for transaction-specific investments undertaken in 
connection with product differentiation and therefore, vertical integration of advertising services and 
advertising intensity are expected to be positively related. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2:   The greater the intensity of advertising, the greater the investment in client specific human 
assets required to develop and produce advertising campaigns, and the greater the likelihood of 
vertical integration of advertising services. 
2.2.4 Technological Intensity and Human Asset Specificity. Most business transactions involve some 
specialized knowledge but the potential gains from specialized knowledge are likely to be largest in 
technological industries.  Williamson (1985) summarizes: "A more harmonious and efficient exchange 
relation - better disclosure, easier reconciliation of differences, more complete cross cultural 
adaptation, more effective team organization and reconfiguration - predictably results from the 
substitution of an internal governance relation [integration] for bilateral trading under those 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
256-7) identified seven dimensions of asset specificity and grouped them into company and customer categories. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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recurrent trading circumstances where assets, of which complex technology transfer is an example, 
have a highly specific character" (p. 294). Lodish (1983) makes a similar point in the advertising 
context: "[I]f your product or service is very technical and very specialized, so that an outside creative 
person would have to spend months learning about the business in order to be able to write copy, it 
might be appropriate to have an in-house creative team" (p. 106).  He argues that media buying may 
also be subject to the same logic, since highly technical products may require specialized media that 
are better known to the advertiser than to any outside agency.  
Kahn (1986) has argued that advertising professionals typically have experience in consumer 
marketing and the knowledge and skills acquired there tend not to be transferable to the 
development and execution of advertising programs for complex, technology-based industrial 
products. Probably the best-known in-house agency was one operated by General Electric for more 
than half a century, offering a wide variety of communications and promotion services to the firm’s 
diverse businesses (Burnside 1991). One motive for General Electric’s in-house agency was the 
technological sophistication of its products (Burnside 1991). Thus in the case of technologically 
intensive industries, vertical integration into advertising services serves to protect human 
asset specific investments; hence:   
H3:    Vertical integration into advertising services is more likely in technologically intensive 
industries in order to protect human asset specific investments.  
2.2.5 Retailing and Temporal Asset Specificity. Another type of asset specificity, first proposed by 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991), is “temporal specificity” that arises “when timely 
responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital” (Williamson 1996, p. 106). Some assets require timely 
but sequential performance by both transacting parties, thus creating a window for opportunism by 
delaying one stage of the process. The transaction between advertiser and provider of advertising 
services may be subject to high temporal asset specificity.  The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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Temporal asset specificity is especially important in retailing. Some advertising programs are 
undertaken for the purpose of reputation/image-building while others are intended to attract 
consumer traffic to store locations. The latter type of advertising emphasizes price and availability of 
store merchandise and requires knowledge of local market conditions (Lal and Matutes 1994). 
Coordination both internally (among departments within a retailing organization) and externally 
(with merchandise vendors and advertising service providers, including local media) is crucial to the 
effectiveness of such programs. Failure to execute advertising to attract consumers promptly can 
undermine its competitive impact. Disclosure of such information to competitors may also be 
damaging. By removing boundaries separating retailer and agency, integration can improve 
coordination and communication of sensitive information, and thereby reduce transactions costs. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H4:   Vertical integration into advertising services is more likely in retailing to protect temporal 
specificity and thereby facilitate the timely use of local market information and internal 
coordination in developing and producing advertising campaigns. 
2.2.6 Creative Industries and Transaction Similarity. Another dimension of transactions is 
“transaction similarity,” first proposed by Coase (1937) in his classic paper where he argued that the 
cost of internal organization would increase with the “dissimilarity” of transactions. Masten, Meehan, 
and Snyder (1991) further developed the comparative transaction cost rationale underlying Coase’s 
suggestion and advanced the hypothesis that “transactions that are similar to ones in which the firm 
is already engaged are more likely to be integrated” (p. 8). Advertising services fit Caves’ (2000) 
concept of a “creative industry” possessing “bedrock” properties that differentiate them from other 
economic sectors5. Advertising agencies are commonly described as “idea” businesses (Backer 1993) 
and creativity in advertising is the elusive quality prized by agencies and sought by clients in their 
                                                            
5Caves emphasizes: “…creative goods and services, the processes of their production, and the preferences or tastes of creative 
artists differ in substantial and systematic (if not universal) ways from their counterparts in the rest of  the economy where 
creativity plays a lesser (if seldom negligible) role” (2000, p.2). The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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ongoing search for “breakthrough” advertising. Disagreements about creative processes and 
products are a notoriously commonplace source of disharmony in agency-client relations (Michell 
1988). Organization theory has long emphasized that the type of organization structure that enhances 
creativity and innovation differs from that designed to facilitate efficiency (Daft 1986, Chapt. 7; 
Tushman and O’Reilly 1997). Similarly, the fostering of creativity calls for different control and 
reward systems from those typically relied upon in business organizations (Amabile 1996, 1998). 
Concern about an in-house agency’s ability to attract and retain creative personnel is often expressed 
in discussions about the viability of such operations found in the trade press (e.g., Pulver 1979). To 
illustrate, the chairman of Procter & Gamble informed shareholders during the wave of agency 
mergers in the mid-1980’s that the firm had considered acquiring a full-service advertising agency. 
The idea was ultimately rejected on the grounds that it was unlikely that an in-house operation could 
match the creativity of external agencies (Alter 1986). 
Thus in industries where creativity is critical to their core businesses, firms may be expected to 
engage routinely in transactions similar to those associated with advertising services. By internalizing 
advertising services, such firms may exploit economies of scope as a result of past investments made 
in human assets and management systems, and thereby reduce transaction costs below the level that 
would prevail were they to employ outside agencies.  
H5:   Vertical integration into advertising services is more likely in creative industries where 
transactions relating to advertising services are similar to those already undertaken in 
connection with core business activities and scope economies are available. 
3.0  DATABASE AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the database employed along with definitions of variables. The econometric 
model and estimation method used for hypotheses testing are then presented. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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3.1 Industry Cross Sections 
As Caves and Bradburd (1988) observe: “Testing hypotheses about vertical integration on cross 
sections of industries is attractive for the variance it supplies in the structural determinants and for 
the chance to observe entities in presumed long-run equilibrium” (p. 265).6 Our hypotheses are 
formulated at the industry level and the data analyzed here consists of two years of annual 
observation (1991 and 1999) for a cross section consisting of the same set of 69 manufacturing and 
service industries, as defined by two-digit SIC categories.7  
Demand for advertising is cyclical (Blank 1962) and shifts in interest in the use of in-house 
agencies have sometimes been attributed to the business cycle (Haase, Lockley, and Digges 1934; 
Loomis 1972). The years 1991 and 1999 bracket a business cycle in the U.S. economy as a whole, as 
dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2005). The downturn occurred in the 
advertising industry in 1991, when for the first time in four decades, total U.S. advertising 
expenditures declined by 1.6% from the previous year (measured in current $). Throughout the 
remainder of the decade, expenditures grew steadily until 2000, when another decline occurred. 1991-
99 was also a period when agency compensation was steadily shifting away from billings-based 
commissions to labor rate-based fees (Arzaghi et al. 2008, Beals 2007).  
Schmalensee (1989) draws attention to the bias that may arise from cross sectional studies when 
departures from long-run equilibrium are correlated with the independent variables. He emphasizes 
the desirability of replicating cross sectional studies over time and using panel designs to check the 
robustness of results. The 1991 and 1999 cross sections employed here constitute a balanced panel 
and permit assessment of the stability of results over time while controlling for unobserved industry 
factors that remained fixed over this time interval.   
                                                            
6 Other studies of vertical integration using inter-industry analysis include Balakrishnan and Wernerfeldt (1986) and Levy 
(1985). Also see Hubbard (2008) on the contribution of cross-industry studies in providing stylized facts on firm boundaries. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
17 
3.2 Variable Definitions 
The key variables were operationally defined as follows8: 
SVIit   = Share of the total number of advertisers in industry i reporting use of an in-house agency in 
year t, 0 < SVI it < 1.  i = 1, 2,…, 69. t = 1991 or 1999. 
NUNit = The number of advertisers in industry i in year t. 
ADXit = Mean advertising expenditure per advertiser in industry i during year t, 000’s constant $1991. 
ASRit  = Mean advertising intensity per advertiser in industry i during  year t, ratio of advertising                     
expenditures to sales revenue, expressed as a percentage where both series were deflated 
separately to constant $1991. 
TECH = Dummy variable to denote a technological industry, as defined in Table 2. 
RETL = Dummy variable to denote a retailing industry, as defined in Table 2. 
CRET = Dummy variable to denote a creative industry, as defined in Table 2. 
As defined above, ADX and ASR are taken as measures of advertising spending and intensity, 
respectively, for a representative advertiser in an industry. The source of information on advertisers 
and agencies is the Standard Directory of Advertisers (1992, 2000) that reports the names of agencies 
employed by advertisers, and distinguishes between use of in-house and independent agencies The 
Standard Directory also includes other information about advertisers, including SIC industry code, 
advertising expenditure, and sales revenue. 
Consistent with previous research on firm boundaries and governance, we examine the outcomes 
of decisions made by “advertisers,” the relevant competitive unit in an industry that included 
divisions or business units of multidivisional firms as well as firms operating in a single industry. 
Accordingly, using data in the Standard Directory of Advertisers, we classified each advertiser as 
having either an in-house or an outside agency and calculated the share (SVIit) of all advertisers 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 The only two-digit SIC categories excluded were government (#43 and #91-96), wholesale trade (#50-51), legal (#81) and 
miscellaneous services (#88-89). A listing of the VI shares by SIC category  is available upon request. 
8 In our analysis, monetary variables are expressed in constant $1991. Advertising series were deflated using the McCann-
Erickson cost per thousand exposures (CPM) indices for national and local budgets available from Robert Coen, Universal The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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(NUNit) in a given SIC industry and year operating an in-house agency. As is evident from the 
summary statistics presented in Table 1, both cross sections exhibit considerable variability across SIC 
categories with respect to vertical integration share (SVI) as well as the two advertising variables 
(ADX and ASR). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The Standard Directory  claimed coverage of U.S. advertisers with annual advertising 
expenditures of $75,000 or more in 1991 and $200,000 or more in 1999 ($142, 000 in constant 1991 
dollars). The number of advertisers listed for which agency, advertising expenditure, sales revenue, 
and SIC information was available was 9,527 in 1991 and 15,548 in 1999. Collectively, the advertising 
expenditures ($ current) reported by the firms included in the cross sections amounted to $65.45 
billion for the 1991 sample and $100.98 billion for the 1999 sample (or $71.82 billion in constant 1991 
dollars).9 Those amounts represent 50.66% and 46.74% of total advertising expenditures reported by 
all U.S. corporations in 1991 and 1999, respectively, as measured by the Internal Revenue Service 
(Statistics of Income, 1991, 1999) from corporate tax returns. 
Across all SIC industries, the weighted (by the number of units within each industry) share of all 
units classified as having vertical integrated advertising services was 43.26% in 1991 and 53.38% in 
1999. Surprisingly, about half of all advertisers had internalized at least some of their advertising 
services. The vertical integration shares for the common SIC categories co vary moderately across the 
two years (r = .541) with the shares for 57 of the 69 SIC categories being larger in 1999 than in 1991. 
As shown in Table 1, for both years, the magnitude of SVI varies widely across industries (from one-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
McCann, New York. All other series were converted to $1991 using the GDP implicit price deflator reported by the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (Economic Report of the President (2002), Table B-3). 
9 The information reported in the Standard Directory of Advertisers tends to be more complete for large advertisers as 
compared to smaller ones and this tendency appears more pronounced  in 1991 than in 1999 While the number of advertisers 
included in the 1999 Standard Directory  was more than 60 percent greater than in the 1991 version, this expanded coverage 
apparently captured comparatively more smaller advertisers than was the case for the 1991 sample. Although the two cross The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
19 
sixth to three-quarters or more) but the standard deviations of the two distributions are very similar 
(.116 and .127).Turning to the two advertising variables, we see from Table 1 that the medians and 
standard deviations for both ADX and ASR (constant $1991) are greater for the 1991 cross section 
than for 1999. The relative dispersion (as indicated by the values of the coefficients of the variation) of 
ADX is virtually identical for the two years but for ASR, the coefficient of variation is greater in 1999 
than 1991. Across the 69 industries, the correlation between the1991 and 1999 values of both ADX and 
ASR is high (r = .725 for ADX and r = .779 for ASR).    
Three hypotheses relate to particular types of industries: technological, retailing, and creative. For 
each, we set criteria for inclusion and then identified the two-digit SIC’s that satisfied the criteria, 
using a separate dummy variable for each industry. The composition of each of the three industry 
groups is shown below in Table 2.    
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, technological industries are associated with human asset specificity. 
Guided by information on R&D intensity (National Science Foundation (NSF) 1991), we assigned six 
SIC categories (Chemical Products, Industrial Machinery, Electronic Equipment, Transportation 
Equipment, Instruments, and Business Services) to the technology group shown in Table 2. The first 
five industries spent above average amounts on research and development, measured as a percentage 
of sales. Since the NSF data covers only manufacturing industries, we added a sixth, “Business 
Services,” a category that includes software development as a major component. The retailing sector 
is readily identified in the SIC classification and contains the 8 SIC categories listed in Table 2. 
Throsby (2001) defines “cultural goods and services” as those that “involve creativity in their 
production, embody some degree of intellectual property and convey symbolic meaning” (p. 112). 
Caves (2000) refers to “creative” industries as those “supplying goods and services that we broadly 
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associate with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value” (p. 1). Howkins (2001) lists a set of 
“core creative industries” that produce intellectual property in the form of patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and proprietary designs. Relating these conceptions of creative industries to SIC 
categories, we identified four industries that involve the creation of intellectual property (Apparel, 
Furniture, Printing, and Engineering Services) plus another pair that are communications media 
(Communications and Motion Pictures). The activities of this second set of industries relate to two 
major advertising services, message creation and media placement.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
3.3 Model Specification and Estimation 
We use a logistic regression model to test our hypotheses. The dependent variable of interest, 
SVIi, is the share of the NUNi advertisers in an industry who use vertically integrated advertising 
services rather than outside agencies. Since the observed SVIi represent grouped data, the values of 
which fall within the interval 0 and 1, we apply the logit transformation to the SVIi proportions 
(Ashton 1972). The full model used to test jointly the five hypotheses presented earlier is specified as: 
Log{SVIit /1-SVIit} = αt + βt LADXit + γt LASRit +θ1it TECH +θ2it RETL +θ3it CRET + εit , 
t = 1991, 1999; i = 1, 2, …, 69 industries;  (5) 
where LADX and LASR are the natural logarithms of the advertising expenditure and 
advertising intensity variables, respectively. The logarithmic transformation allows for possible non-
linear effects; TECH, RETL, and CRET are dummy variables representing the sectors defined in Table 
2; εit is a random disturbance term; and α, β, γ, and the θ’s are parameters to be estimated. Summary 
statistics for the variables in (5) are presented in the Appendix (Tables A1-A3). 
To investigate the possibility that the two advertising variables in model (5) may be jointly 
determined along with the share of vertically integrated advertisers, we developed a set of 
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instrumental variables and then conducted tests for endogeneity (Hausman 1978) of the two 
advertising variables for each cross section.  
Instrumental variables (IV’s) were defined using information compiled annually by the IRS from 
individual corporate tax returns and reported as aggregate amounts across firms for two-digit SIC 
categories. The IRS data used for instruments essentially represent corporate population totals for the 
various SIC categories and thus can be distinguished from the measures of ADX and ASR that were 
obtained from the Standard Directory of Advertisers.   
Studies of advertising budgeting practices indicate that it is commonplace for advertisers to begin 
with last year’s budget and then adjust that level upward or downward according to expectations 
about developments in the coming year (Farris and West 2007). In order to reduce any correlation 
between instruments and the disturbance term in (5), values of all IV’s were lagged two years. In 
addition to two year lagged values of ADX and ASR as measured by the IRS data, three additional 
IV’s were obtained from this source: percentage gross margin (GMR or business receipts minus costs 
of sales and operations divided by business receipts); percentage net income (NIR or net income as a 
percentage of business receipts); and mean income tax (MTX). GMR approximates the Learner price-
cost margin that is often used as an indicator of product differentiation. If advertising increases 
product differentiation, then GMR should be positively related to advertising spending (cf., Boulding, 
Lee, and Staelin 1994). NIR is a measure of profitability; theory predicts and empirical studies 
confirm that advertising intensity is positively related to average industry profits (see Schamalensee 
1989 for a review). Finally, the income tax (MTX) a firm pays is related to its profitability but the rate 
at which corporate income is taxed is determined exogenously. 
For each cross section, the results from the Hausman (1978) test indicated that the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity for ADX and ASR could not be rejected (1991: χ2 = 2.123, df = 2, p = .346; 1999: χ2 = 
3.985, df = 2, p = .136). Assuming the test is asymptotically valid, we conclude that the advertising The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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variables and vertical integration share are not jointly determined10.   
Hence, we estimated model (5) by pooling the observations for the two cross sections, treating the 
two advertising variables as exogenous. The estimation was carried out via generalized least squares 
(GLS) using EVIEWS5 (2004). Pooling permits estimation of fixed effects and allows for cross section-
specific hetereoskedasticity.11  Summary statistics and correlation matrices are presented in the 
Appendix (Tables A2, A3, and A4). 
4.0 RESULTS 
Cross section-specific parameter estimates for the five regressors in (5) that relate to 
our hypotheses are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Also shown there are robust 
(heteroskedasticity-consistent) estimates of the standard errors of the parameters (White 
1980).  Wald tests were then conducted to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
estimates for each regressor were equal for both cross sections. Based on the outcomes of 
those tests, we then estimated a mixed model, where the coefficients are either cross section-
specific (unequal parameters for 1991 and 1999) or common (1991 and 1999 parameters 
constrained to be equal).  The mixed model estimates are shown in columns (3), (4), and (5) 
of Table 3.   
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The adjusted R2 statistics shown in Table 3 indicate that model (5) accounts for about 30% of the 
                                                            
10 When the number of IV’s exceeds the number of possibly endogenous explanatory variables, a test for over-identifying 
restrictions due to Sargan (1958) may be used to test whether the candidate instruments are valid in the sense of being 
uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation. In particular, the null hypothesis tested is that all IV’s are 
uncorrelated with the structural error term, assuming that at least one of the IV’s is exogenous. In the present context, as 
defined above, we have five IV’s and two possibly endogenous variables (ADXit and ASRit) for each of the two cross sections. 
The results indicated that the null hypothesis could not be rejected for either the 1991 or 1999 cross section; the χ2 statistics 
were well below the critical values of that statistic at even the .20 level. Thus, the tests for over-identifying restrictions are 
consistent with the assumption that the five IV’s are exogenous. 
11 Eq. (5) was also estimated as a system of two seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). SUR estimates led to conclusions 
similar to those discussed below for the pooled estimates with respect to the tests of the five hypotheses. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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total variance in the logit dependent variable (LSVI). The standard deviations of LSVI are of similar 
magnitudes for both cross sections (.520 and .540, for 1991 and 1999, respectively). The estimated 
fixed effects are significant for the mixed-model specification.  The Ramsey (1969) RESET tests gave 
no indication of model functional form misspecification. 
 
4.1 Advertising Expenditure and Intensity 
As may be seen from Table 3, the estimated coefficients for log mean advertising 
expenditures/firm (LADX) have the expected negative sign and remain relatively stable (within one 
standard error) in both the cross section-specific and mixed specifications. Using one-tail tests, two of 
the estimated coefficients are significant at the .001 level and the third is almost significant at the .01 
level. Consistent with H1 then, we find that vertical integration share decreases monotonically across 
industries as log mean advertising expenditure/firm increases. 
Turning to advertising intensity (LASR), we again find that the estimated coefficients all have the 
expected positive sign but differ in magnitude; the 1991 estimate is considerably larger than that for 
1999. For the mixed model, the estimated coefficient for 1991 is significant at the .001 level while that 
for 1999 is almost significant at the .10 level. Thus, these results generally support H2; vertical 
integration increases monotonically as advertising intensity, our proxy for human asset specificity, 
increases. 
4.2 Industry Sector Dummy Variables 
Hypotheses H3-H5 relate to the technological, retailing, and creative sectors, each sector 
represented by a dummy variable. Across specifications, the estimated coefficients for the three 
dummy variables all have the expected positive sign but differ in statistical significance. Results for 
the dummy variable, TECH, indicate consistent support for H3; vertical integration of advertising 
services is more likely in technologically intensive industries. The estimated coefficient for TECH is The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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larger for 1999 than for 1991, the former being significant at the .01 level while the latter is significant 
at the .10 level (p = .079).  
 The results provide only mixed support for H5, that vertical integration of advertising service is 
more likely for creative than other industries. The estimated coefficient for CRET in 1999 is highly 
significant (p < .001) while that for 1991 is of much smaller magnitude and not significantly different 
from zero. 
We obtain no support for H4, that vertical integration of advertising services is more likely in 
retailing industries. Although the coefficient estimates for RETL have the predicted positive signs, the 
ratios of the estimated coefficients to their standard error are all less than unity. Overall, the evidence 
points to rejection of H4. 
5.0 DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Double Marginalization (H1) and Advertising Intensity (H2) Hypotheses 
 
The results provided consistent support for our first pair of hypotheses relating advertising 
expenditures and intensity to vertical integration. Across all specifications and for both years, the 
share of firms in an industry integrating advertising services decreased as the mean advertising 
expenditure per firm increased. In line with H1, the tradeoff between the potential gains from 
avoiding double marginalization but sacrificing scale-related economies tends to operate so as to 
decrease the likelihood of vertical integration as the size of advertising outlays increases.  
To gauge the sensitivity of vertical integration to changes in advertising expenditures, we 
estimated the elasticity of the share of advertisers in an industry who had internalized advertising 
services (SVI) with respect to ADX. The elasticities were evaluated at three values of ADX, 
representing the median (Q2), lower (Q1) and upper (Q3) quartiles, respectively, of the ADX The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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distributions for 1991 and 1999. In calculating these elasticities, the values of the three industry group 
dummy variables (TECH, RETL, and CRET) were all set equal to zero (Appendix, Table A4).12  The 
elasticities with respect to changes in ADX are quite small (in absolute magnitude) and essentially flat 
over the interquartile range of the 1991 and 1999 ADX distributions. A 10% increase in ADX is 
associated with reductions in SVI of approximately 1.0% for both years.13 
Taking advertising intensity as a proxy for human asset specificity, our results are consistent with 
H2 that the greater the investment in client-specific human assets required to develop and to produce 
advertising campaigns, the greater the likelihood that advertising services will be vertically 
integrated. To measure the magnitude of this effect, elasticities of SVI with respect to advertising 
intensity (ASR) were estimated in a similar manner to that discussed for advertising expenditures 
and are presented in the Appendix (Table A4).14  The ASR elasticities are of similar magnitude to 
those obtained for ADX and also relatively invariant over the interquartile range. A 10% increase in 
ASR is associated with about a 1.6% increase in SVI in 1991 and a 0.4% increase in 1999.15 
 
5.2. Industry Sector Hypotheses (H3-H5) 
 
H3 predicted that internalization of advertising services would be more likely in technologically 
intensive industries where human asset specificity for advertising services was particularly high. The 
estimated coefficients for the dummy variable, TECH, were found to be uniformly positive across 
                                                            
12  The elasticity of vertical integration share, SVI, with respect to ADX for eq. (5) is: Esvi.adx =  ∂SVI / ∂ADX (ADX/SVI) = β (1 - 
SVI); where: SVI = exp(g) / (1 + exp(g)), given that: ln (SVI / (1 – SVI)) = g, where g is specified as shown on the right hand 
side of (5) above. 
13 Wald tests indicated that the null hypothesis that Esvi.adx = 0 could be rejected at the .01 level for all three elasticities in both 
1991 and 1999. 
14 Esvi.asr =  ∂SVI / ∂ASR (ASR/SVI) = γ (1-SVI). 
15 Based on Wald tests, the null hypothesis that Esvi.asr = 0 was rejected at the .01 level for the three 1991 elasticities but at only 
the .10 level for the 1999 elasticities.  The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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specifications and the estimated common coefficient for the mixed model was statistically significant 
at the .01 level. To assess the magnitude of this effect, with ADX and ASR at their medians, we 
compared the expected values of SVI when TECH was set equal to one and zero, respectively, using 
the parameter estimates for the mixed model. The predicted values of SVI were evaluated at the 
median values of the ADX and ASR variables. These estimates indicated that the expected share of 
advertisers in technologically intensive industries exceeded the level expected for non-technologically 
intensive industries by approximately 6% in 1991 and 13% in 1999. The latter estimate was 
significantly different from zero at the .05 level but the former was not significant (p>.10). 
H5 predicted that internalization of advertising services would be greater in creative than in 
other industries on grounds of transaction similarity; this prediction received strong support for the 
1999 cross section but not for 1991. With a similar calculation to the above, the increase in SVI for 
creative industries was approximately 28% in 1999, significantly different from zero at the .001 level. 
H4 predicted that the likelihood of vertical integration would be greater for retailing industries 
but the evidence from both the 1991 and 1999 cross sections failed to support this prediction. The 
rationale underlying this hypothesis emphasized the distinction between two varieties of retail 
advertising: building image/reputation versus store traffic. It was argued that the latter gives rise to 
temporal human asset specificity and accordingly, favors vertical integration. However, our simple 
dichotomous classification of industries (retail versus all other) clearly fails to capture any inter-
industry (or intra-industry) variation in the mix of image and traffic-oriented advertising. Interacting 
the retailing sector dummy variable with a measure of local (versus regional or national) advertising 
would provide a more discriminating way to test H4. For similar reasons, it also seems likely that the 
retailing sector is one where hybrid governance structures can be expected, e.g., local, traffic-building 
advertising performed in-house with image-oriented national campaigns assigned to external 
agencies. Pryor (2001, 2002) has shown that concentration levels in retailing rose over the period 
1971-1997 and suggests that this trend reflects mergers and acquisitions and growth of national The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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chains. These developments may have been accompanied by changes in the mix of national and local 
advertising employed by retailers that, in turn, have diminished the importance of temporal asset 
specificity.   
5.3 Directions for Future Research 
The panel design employed in this study wherein observation obtained at two points in time for 
the same cross-section of industries has the advantage of providing comprehensive coverage of the 
U.S. advertising industry and permitting important econometric issues to be addressed, including 
tests for detecting endogeneity and differences between period in hypothesized relationships arising 
from exogeneous factors such as changes relating to the business cycle and institutional 
arrangements. At the same time, the limitations of the methods employed in this study deserve 
mention and future research should seek to address them. 
  First, our measure of vertical integration does not distinguish between full and partial or 
“tapered” integration (Michael 2000; Perry 1989). With the shift away from billings-based 
compensation and the growth of holding companies (Silk and Berndt 2004), the unbundling of 
agency creative and media services has become more common, increasing the likelihood of partial 
integration (Horsky 2006). Second, sector dummy variables afford only a crude means of inferring 
inter-industry differences in transaction costs. Here, as in other areas of transaction cost research, 
more refined measures of transaction costs and asset specificity would be desirable (Klein 2005). 
Finally, how integration or separation of advertising services affects client and brand performance is 
beyond the scope of this study and is left for future research. Case studies and cross-sectional surveys 
of firms would offer a valuable complement to this investigation by extending our micro-analytic 
understanding of decisions affecting contemporary governance structures relating to advertising and 
marketing services.   
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Client interest in the vertical integration of advertising services has varied over time (Loomis 
1972) and Douglas (2004) has recently raised the prospect that clients may once again give serious 
consideration to vertical integration of advertising services. While such a development might appear 
unlikely to some in this era of widespread outsourcing of marketing services (McGovern and Quelch 
2005), major changes that have occurred in advertising agency-client relations suggest otherwise. The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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First of all, it is informative to view the preeminent place independent suppliers have long 
occupied within the historical context of how the governance structure of the advertising and 
marketing services industry evolved in the U.S. since the mid-19th century.  Pope (1983) traces the 
dominance of independent full-service agencies to the institutional arrangements that evolved early 
in the industry’s history. Foremost among those arrangements was the practice of compensating 
agencies through a commission on client expenditures for media space and time and the production 
of advertising messages. The commission system, supported by a broader set of trade practices 
known as the “recognition system,” effectively prohibited advertisers from purchasing media directly 
at the same price as agencies, thereby removing an incentive for integration. Pope argued that: “If 
(the commission system) had been eradicated, the industry might well have witnessed a partial 
internalization of agency activities by large advertisers” (p. 152). In the wake of a 1956 consent decree 
that is credited with dismantling the recognition system (Holland 1981), the media commission-based 
system of advertising agency compensation has gradually been replaced with labor fee-based 
compensation (Beals 2007, Arjaghi et al. 2008).  This latter development has been accompanied by a 
number of related changes in agency-client relations, including the “unbundling” of services by 
traditional “full-service” agencies (Horsky 2006, Arzaghi et al. 2008). Thus, the increase in 
internalization of advertising services between 1991 and 1999 found here is consistent with the 
removal of institutional barriers that had earlier stood in the way of the  internalization of advertising 
services; namely the unbundling of advertising agency services, and diminished reliance on media 
commissions in compensating advertising agencies.  
  Second, in recent years “accountability” and in particular, the measurement of returns to 
communication spending, have become prominent issues in agency-client relations (Duboff 2007). 
The adoption of agency compensation methods related to labor charges and/or performance criteria 
(Beals 2007) and the involvement of professional procurement personnel in the management of The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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agency relations (Escobar 2006) has heightened the cost consciousness of clients with respect to 
advertising and marketing services. More than three decades ago, Gross (1972) questioned the 
optimality of the allocation of an advertising budget between the costs of  creating and developing 
advertising messages versus outlays for media space and time to reach the target audience that arose 
under the prevailing policies of reliance on full-service agencies and commission-based agency 
compensation, He reached the provocative conclusion that advertisers were typically under-spending 
on creative development relative to media by a wide margin. This lead Gross to advocate the 
unbundling of creative and media services and the abandonment of media commission as the basis of 
agency compensation in the interests of advertisers’ exerting greater control over the strategic 
allocation of their advertising outlays and thereby improve the return on advertising spending. In 
this study, we have identified industry conditions under which the internalization of advertising and 
marketing services might also be a policy that enhances control and returns to advertising. 
  Advertisers are faced with the challenge of coordinating a vast array of independent 
communication services and suppliers (Draft 2003, Liodice 2008). The advertising industry is 
currently undergoing a major transformation as it absorbs new information and communication 
technologies that offer not only new media for reaching customers but also new tools for managing 
campaigns, such as in the case of online advertising, sophisticated economic and statistical methods 
(cf. Evans 2008). There is talk of disintermediation of agencies and other communication service 
providers in the face of the expanding activities of internet firms such as Google and Microsoft 
(Battelle 2005), spurring further acquisitions by holding companies to develop their capabilities in 
digital marketing. The diversified communication and marketing services available globally through 
holding companies afford advertisers an additional set of options affecting both production and 
transaction costs (Silk and Berndt 2004). These technological and structural changes are likely to 
result in shifts in production and transaction costs and thus existing patterns of vertical relations The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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between advertisers and suppliers of marketing services are also likely to continue to evolve. 
  Changes in corporate policies and organization often follow changes in economic and 
technological conditions. Procter and Gamble’s director of corporate marketing has been quoted as 
saying: “There’s so much inefficiency in the process we create and the agencies create” (Johnson 2003, 
p. 16).  The firm has re-structured its internal brand organization and initiated tests of a new 
approach to managing relations with its outside suppliers of marketing services (Neff 2007). Whereas 
in 1986, Procter and Gamble considered but ultimately rejected a proposal to acquire an advertising 
agency on grounds that the creativity of an in-house operation was unlikely to match that of an 
independent agency (Alter1986). More recently in 2000, the firm established an in-house division that 
develops and implements word-of-mouth campaigns and serves both internal and external clients 
(McCarthy 2007). Interestingly, the latter development occurred at the time Procter and Gamble had 
made important changes in its policies relating to innovation (Deutsch 2008; Laffley and Charon 
2008).  
 Given that the present governance structure appears to be in a state of flux, it is an opportune 
time for industry-specific knowledge to be incorporated into guidelines intended to support 
practitioners’ decisions relating to the vertical integration of advertising and marketing services (e.g., 
Anderson and Weitz 1986), adding to the current focus on issues of incentives, monitoring, and scale. 
In particular the following considerations deserve attention. 
First, internalization should be included in the set of policy options considered in the course of 
conducting agency search and selection processes. Our findings indicate that in-house operation is 
most likely to be a viable option for firms competing in technology-oriented and creative industries. 
The introduction of in-house advertising services at Google (Klaassen 2007) and Conde Nash Media 
Group (Story 2007) are recent cases that reflect this pattern. Study of the practices and experiences of 
industry competitors may be a source of useful learning as to the scope and sustainability of The Internalization of Advertising Services:  An Inter-Industry Analysis 
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alternative governance structures and the risks of short-lived “mistaken” integration decisions 
(Williamson 1985, p.107)...  
Second, a detailed cost comparison is required to assess the tradeoff between employing an 
independent service provider versus supporting an in-house operation. Client understanding of 
agency cost behavior has grown through the conduct of audits in connection with reviews of agency 
compensation programs (Beals 2007). Consulting firms specializing in agency selection and 
compensation (Beard 2002) have developed databases that might be tapped for information about 
cost levels and size-related economies.   
7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Examining a broad range of industries, we observed that forty to fifty percent of all U.S. 
advertisers in 1991 and 1999 used at least some in-house agencies, with the level of penetration 
varying markedly across two-digit SIC categories. Both production costs and transaction costs 
exerted influence consistent with our theoretical hypotheses relating to inter-industry differences; in 
particular, larger advertisers, advertisers of technical products, advertisers of creative products, and 
advertisers of differentiated products were more likely to integrate.  The evidence was generally 
robust across two different time periods and establishes that industry differences are important in 
accounting for the incidence of integration of advertising services. These results represent an initial 
step in developing a body of stylized facts that can encourage and support further analysis of vertical 
relations in advertising and marketing services industry, a neglected domain of research and one that 
is likely to undergo considerable change, creating challenges and opportunities for both managers 




 (n = 69 SIC Categories) 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                          Share Vertically         Number of               Advertising                 Adv. /Sales 
                               Integrated               Advertisers           Expenditures                     Ratio 
    ( % )       ( $ ’ 0 0 0 )             ( % )  
Statistic  SVI91  SVI99  NUN91  NUN99    ADX91   ADX99  ASR91  ASR99 
                
Mean   42.3  50.7  138.07  225.33  16,112.17    8,227.64   2.494  1.708 
                
Median  43.5  53.5    67  114  12,414.05    6,612.20   2.107  1.296 
                
Max  83.3  75.0  1,008  1,582  87,278.13  49,149.95   8.267   9.147 
                
Min  16.7  16.7         5         4       373.33       213.36    .071   .059 
                
Std. Dev.  11.6  12.6  184.71  292.60  15,139.14     7,706.55   1.867   1.541 
                
Coef.  of  Variation  .274  .249  1.338 1.299 .940  .937  .749 .902 




ASSIGNMENT OF SIC INDUSTRIES TO SECTORS AND DUMMY VARIABLES 
 
 
Industry Sector                     SIC Number                Name 
 
Technology (6)                         TECH = 1, 0 otherwise  
                                                          28   Chemical & Allied Products 
                                                          35  Industrial Machinery & Equipment 
                                                          36   Electronic & Other Electric Equipment  
                                                          37   Transportation Equipment 
                                                          38     Instruments & Related Products 
                                                          73     Business Services 
Retail (8)                                    RETL = 1, 0 otherwise 
52  Building Materials & Garden Supplies 
53  General Merchandise Stores 
54  Food Stores 
55  Automotive Dealers & Service Stations 
56  Apparel & Accessory Stores 
57  Furniture & Home Furnishings Stores 
58  Eating & Drinking Places 
59  Misc.  
Creative (6)                                 CRET = 1, 0 otherwise 
                                                           23  Apparel & Other Textile Products 
25  Furniture & Fixtures 
27  Printing & Publishing 
                                                           48                       Communications 
 78                      Motion Picture Services 
                                                           87                  Engineering & Management Services 
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Table 3 
POOLED GLS ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
OF SHARE OF UNITS WITH IN-HOUSE ADVERTISING SERVICES 
Estimated Regression coefficients 
(Standard Error/Ratio of Coefficient to Standard Error) 


























































































































        
R2 (adj.)  .304   .315 
Std. Err. Est.  .473   .470 
Residual Corr.  .411   .411 
*Heteroskedastic-consistent covariances and standard errors 
a p < .10  b p < .05  c p < .01 (one-tail tests) 







SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN LOGIT REGRESSIONS 
 (n = 69 SIC Categories) 
 
  1991     1999   
Statistic   Logit  SVI  LADX  LASR  Logit SVI  LADX  LASR 
Mean -.330  9.306  .571  .022  8.640  .101 
Median -.262  9.427  .745  .140  8.800  .259 
Max         1.609  12.129  2.112 1.099 10.803  2.113 
Min -1.609  5.922  -2.648  -1.609 5.363  -2.839 




CORRELATION MATRIX FOR 1991 VARIABLES 
(n = 69 SIC Categories) 
 Logit 
SVI 





     
LADX -.267  1.000      
LASR .461  .194 1.000     
TECH .077  .010  .045  1.000    
RETL .054  .259  .237 -.112  1.000   
CRET .080  .011  .121 -.095 -.112  1.000 





CORRELATION MATRIX FOR 1999 VARIABLES 








   
1.000 
     
LADX  -.263 1.000      
LASR .126  .233  1.000    
TECH .106 .035  .107  1.000    
RETL -.026  .250  .264  -.112  1.000  




ELASTICIES OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION SHARE WITH RESPECT TO 




     EVI.ADX                 E VI.ASR 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
  1991 1999 1991 1999 
       Q1    -.105c -.092c .170c .037a 
  (.032) (.028) (.043) (.029) 
      
  Median  -.109c -.097c .161c .036a 
  (.034) (.031) (.038) (.028) 
      
       Q3  -.114c -.102c .153c .035a 
  (.037) (.034) (.034) (.027) 
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